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STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5 is determinative of the
Court's ability to award attorney's fees and costs to the
appellant if the trial court's judgment is reversed.

It states:

A court may award costs and attorney's fees
to either party that prevails in a civil
action based upon any promissory note,
written contract, or other writing executed
after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of
the promissory note, written contract, or
other writing allow at least one party to
recover attorney's fees.
There are no other determinative constitutional
provisions, statutes, ordinances or rules.

-2a-

TABLE OF CONTENTS
JURISDICTION

2

ISSUES PRESENTED

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3

Nature and History of the Case

3

Statement of Facts

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

7

ARGUMENT

8

I.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT' S FIRST CONCLUSION OF LAW
DISREGARDS THE CLEAR INTENT AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF
THE PARTIES.

8

THE TRIAL COURT IN ITS SECOND AND THIRD CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW ADDRESSING FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION, APPLIED
ERRONEOUS LEGAL STANDARDS

10

A.

Third Conclusion--"Unconscionability"

10

B.

Second Conclusion--"Without Fault"

11

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT BELL DID
NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO REPUDIATE THE ADVERTISING
AGREEMENT
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT
ASSUMPTION OF RISK NEGATES A DEFENSE OF MUTUAL
MISTAKE

15

18

CONCLUSION

20

ADDENDUM

22

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Bentlev v. Potter. 694 P. 2d 617 (Utah 1984)

11, 12

Copper State Leasing Co. v. Blacker Appliance & Furniture
Co. . 770 P. 2d 88 (Utah 1988)

12, 14

Morris v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co. .
658 P. 2d 1199 (Utah 1983)

16

Nielsen v. MFT Leasing. 656 P. 2d 454 (Utah 1982)
Plas-Tex. Inc. v. U. S. Steel Corp. . 772 S. W. 2d 442
(Texas 1989)
Polyglvcoat Corp. v. Holcomb. 591 P. 2d 449 (Utah
1979)
Robert Langston. Ltd. v. McOuarrie. 741 P. 2d 554
(Utah Ct. App. 1987)

14
17
12
18

Scharf v. BMG Corp. , 700 P. 2d 1068 (Utah 1985)

2

Stewart v. Coffman. 748 P. 2d 579 (Utah App. 1988)

2

Statutes
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (2) (d)
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56.5

2
21

Other Authorities
S. Williston, The Law of Contracts (3d ed. 1961)
Restatement fSecond) of Contracts § 157 (1979)
ii

9, 11, 12
14, 20

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

OUTDOOR SYSTEMS, INC. ,

)

Plaintiff and Appellee,

)

vs •

Case No. 900543-CA

BRUCE BELL & ASSOCIATES,
INC. , a Utah Corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

)
)

Priority No. 16

)

Appeal from Third Circuit Court,
Salt Lake County, Utah
Salt Lake Department, Judge Edward A. Watson

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Paul H. Van Dyke
ELGGREN & VAN DYKE
Attorneys for Appellee
261 East 300 South #175
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Eric C. Olson (4108)
Douglas C. Tingey (5808)
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL &
MCCARTHY

Attorneys for Appellant
50 South Main St. , Suite 1600
P. O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145

JURISDICTION

This appeal is from a Judgment entered in the Third
Circuit Court, Salt Lake Department, on October 3, 1990.

The

Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann,
§ 78-2a-3(2)(d).
ISSUES PRESENTED
a.

Did the trial court err as a matter of law in

holding under the undisputed facts that there was not a failure
or lack of consideration?
b.

Was the trial court' s legal conclusion that the

contract between the parties did not give appellant the right to
reject said contract upon reasonable notice of a defect erroneous
as a matter of law?
c.

Was the trial court' s legal conclusion that there

was no mutual mistake of fact upon which the parties entered into
their contract erroneous as a matter of law?
Standard of Review as to each issue:

The facts as

found by the trial court in this case are not in dispute.

Thus

the issues raised are questions of law and the trial court' s
conclusions of law are accorded no particular deference.
v. BMG Corp. . 700 P. 2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985), Stewart v.
Coffman, 748 P.2d 579 (Utah App. 1988).
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Scharf

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature and History of the Case
This case centers on a contract for billboard
advertising services between the parties to this action
(hereinafter the "Advertising Agreement").

Pursuant to The

Advertising Agreement, the appellee Outdoor Systems, Inc.
("Outdoor Systems") contracted to provide billboard advertising
services on Interstate 19 south of Tucson, Arizona, for the
appellant, Bruce Bell & Associates, Inc. ("Bell").

There is no

dispute that the billboard actually provided by Outdoor Systems
was not visible from the highway.
refused pay for the billboard.

Bell rejected the contract and

Outdoor Systems then brought an

action on the Advertising Agreement in the Third Circuit Court,
Salt Lake County.

The matter was tried on August 7, 1990, before

Judge Edward A. Watson.

On October 3, 1990, Judge Watson entered

his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and rendered judgment
against Bruce Bell in the amount of $10,040.24.
and Conclusions are found at Record No. 56-65.

(The Findings
Each reference

hereinafter to this pleading will be to a specific numerical
paragraph of the "Findings" or "Conclusions".

A copy of the

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law is submitted herewith as
an addendum.)

On October 17, 1990, Bell filed its Notice of

Appeal.
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Statement pf FfrgtS
The facts in this case were undisputed at trial.

The

facts relevant to the legal issues to be addressed by this Court
are as follows:
At all times pertinent to this appeal, Bell was an
advertising agency doing business in Salt Lake City, Utah.
(Finding No. 2. )

Bell was directed by one of its clients to

arrange for a billboard advertisement that would attract
travelers along Interstate 19 near Nogales, Arizona to the Kino
Springs golf course resort south of Tucson, Arizona.
No.

6. )

(Finding

The billboard was to follow a pictorial concept used in

earlier magazine advertisements done by Bell for Kino Springs.
(Finding No. 5. )

Bell contacted Outdoor Systems, an outdoor

advertising company in Arizona, regarding a new board under
construction along Interstate 19 south of Tucson.

(Findings Nos.

1, 8. )
Before the parties entered into the Advertising
Agreement, Outdoor Systems sent Bell a packet of information on
the board containing, among other things, pictures of the board
and certain dimensions.

(Finding No. 9. )

This information

indicated that the proposed billboard was a "cross reader," i. e. ,
to be read across the highway as opposed to from the same side.
It is now known that the sign was approximately 200 yards from
the point of optimal visibility in the oncoming lanes of traffic
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on Interstate 19.

(Finding No. 33. )

The data needed to make

this crucial measurement was to be found in the files of Outdoor
Systems; however, it was never disclosed to Bell.
Because of the distance and relative expense involved,
Bell did not visit the site of the board.

(Finding No. 11.)

Nonetheless, a representative of Bell' s client with no
advertising expertise did drive by the board to verify that it
was there.

(Finding No. 12.)

Steve Brossart, ("Brossart"),

Outdoor System' s representative, was the only person with
advertising experience to actually see the board and its relation
to Interstate 19 before the advertisement was placed on it.
(Trial Transcript, pp. 45, 48.)

Brossart was fully aware that

Bell would not visit the proposed billboard and he had no reason
to believe that anyone else with expertise to evaluate the
suitability of the board would see it.

(Trial Transcript, pp.

48-49. )
On December 7, 1988, Bell and Outdoor Systems entered
into the Advertising Agreement pursuant to which Outdoor Systems
agreed to install Bell' s advertisement on the board and
thereafter to rent it to Bell at a rate of $800,00 per month.
(Defendant' s Exhibit 3C. )

Bell then developed the advertisement

desired for the board and forwarded it to Outdoor Systems.
(Findings Nos. 15, 18.)

The advertisement included a realistic

depiction of Kino Springs with wording directing travelers to
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Kino Springs.

(Finding No. 15. )

After receiving artwork for the

proposed advertisement in mid-January, 1990, Outdoor Systems
contacted Bell and suggested that the advertisement be changed to
make the directional wording at the bottom of the ad larger and
thus more visible.

(Finding No. 20. )

Bell agreed to follow

Outdoor Systems' recommendation and the advertisement so modified
was installed on the board.

(Finding No. 21. )

Brossart admitted at trial that the location of the
billboard made it impossible for the advertisement to be read by
passers-by on Interstate 19.

(Finding No. 32. )

Soon after the

sign was placed on the billboard on February 15, 1989, Bell was
informed by its client that the sign was not visible from the
highway and that it did not approve the sign.
25. )

(Findings Nos. 22,

Bell communicated this information to Outdoor Systems

within a reasonable time after the advertisement was installed.
(Finding No. 26; Trial Transcript p. 58

[Testimony of Steve

Brossart, sales manager for Outdoor Systems]).

To cure the

billboard' s defective condition, Bell proposed that the sign be
repainted in all lettering.

(Finding No. 26. )

However, Outdoor

Systems refused to bear the cost of repainting to cure the
deficiency.

(Finding No. 28. )

Unable to obtain a satisfactory

solution, Bell rejected the Advertising Agreement in writing
within a reasonable time, according to its terms.
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(Finding No.

31 Trial Transcript p. 62 [testimony of Steve Brossart, sales
manager for Outdoor Systems]. )
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The undisputed facts in this matter show that

Outdoor Systems provided a sign to Bell that was not visible from
the highway.

The trial court erroneously concluded that nothing

in the Advertising Agreement between the parties required Outdoor
Systems to provide a sign location which would be effective.
Effective advertising was, however, the essence of the contract
between the parties.

The trial court' s narrow interpretation is

not supported by law or fact.
2.

The trial court further erred by applying

erroneous legal standards to the issue of failure of
consideration.

The trial court incorrectly held that the

standard for failure of consideration was unconscionability and
further applied a narrow definition of the "without fault"
requirement at variance with Utah authorities.

When proper

standards are applied, the undisputed facts show that a failure
of consideration did occur.
3.

The trial court' s interpretation of paragraph 10

of the Advertising Agreement is also erroneous as a matter of
law.

The only reasonable interpretation of paragraph 10 was that

Bell had the right to reject the Advertising Agreement.
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4.

Finally, the trial court incorrectly incorporated

an assumption of risk standard as part of its analysis of the
issue of mutual mistake.

In so doing, the trial court

misconstrued the applicable legal principles.

The Advertising

Agreement was entered into on the assumption by both parties that
the sign would be visible from Interstate 19.

That assumption

was incorrect and the contract should be rescinded on grounds of
mutual mistake.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FIRST CONCLUSION OF LAW DISREGARDS
THE CLEAR INTENT AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE PARTIES.
A single erroneous theme pervades the trial court' s

conclusions of law; and it is on this error, contained in
Conclusion No. 1, that the decision adverse to Bell turns.

The

trial court's first conclusion of law states:
The Court finds that the defendant
failed to pay the contract amount based upon
its expectation that the plaintiff would
provide a sign location which would be
effective. The Court finds that there is
nothing in the contract which requires the
plaintiff to meet this expectation of
Defendant. Rather, the plaintiff s
contractual duty was to faithfully reproduce
the sign from the artwork provided to it by
defendant.
(Conclusion No. 1. )
This conclusion violates the "fundamental rule in the
interpretation of agreements that we should ascertain the prime
-8g \wpl\198\00000qgn W51

object and purpose of the parties. ,f

4 S. Williston, The Law of

Contracts, § 619, p. 733 (3d ed. 1961).

The "prime object and

purpose" of the Advertising Agreement was to provide effective
billboard advertising space for Kino Springs golf course, i.e.,
advertisement that could catch the attention of passing motorists
and communicate the intended message.
38, 47-48. )

(Trial Transcript, pp. 36-

Having executed a contract with such an "object and

purpose," Outdoor Systems undertook a broader range of duties
than, as the trial court concluded, just affixing artwork to a
board.

Clearly, Outdoor Systems was selling much more than that.

It was also selling the location of the billboard.

The

visibility of the billboard from that location was of central
importance.

To attract attention and convey a message, the

billboard at a minimum had to be visible from the highway.

Well

executed art work was not enough.
Before entering into the Advertising Agreement, Outdoor
Systems knew full well the location, limitations, and
measurements of the proposed board space in question.

Outdoor

Systems also knew that Bell, an out-of-state company, would not
view the board and had no direct knowledge of these particulars.
As a consequence, Outdoor Systems was on notice that Bell was
relying exclusively on the information supplied by Outdoor
Systems in making its decision to lease the board.

Yet, Outdoor

Systems neglected to provide Bell with this critical information.
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Rather, it remained silent until the Advertising Agreement was
executed.
While the trial court recognized no duty on the part of
Outdoor Systems beyond affixing the artwork to the billboard,
Outdoor Systems itself recognized a broader duty when, in midJanuary, 1989, it expressed to Bell concern as to the visibility
of the proposed sign.

These acts—although too little and too

late — clearly demonstrate that Outdoor Systems knew it was
selling more than artwork.

Further, it is without dispute that

Outdoor Systems recognized the limited visibility of the
billboard well before any artwork was in place.

The trial

court' s conclusion that Outdoor Systems' only duty under the
Advertising Agreement was to affix artwork to a billboard is
erroneous as a matter of law.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT IN ITS SECOND AND THIRD CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW ADDRESSING FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION, APPLIED
gRRQNEQUg LEgAL STANDARD?.
The trial court' s second and third conclusions of law

deal with failure of consideration and are erroneous as a matter
of law.
A.

Third Conclusion--"Unconscionability"

The trial court' s third conclusion of law states:
The court finds that although there may
have been unequal consideration in this
contract that the disparity in consideration
was not unconscionable and, therefore, does
not find a failure of consideration by reason
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of unconscionability in the disparity of
consideration.
(Conclusion No. 3).
"Unconscionability" is not the legal standard by which
a failure of consideration is measured.

The correct standard for

failure of consideration, as stated in Bentley v. Potter, 694
P. 2d 617, 619 (Utah 1984), is "wherever one who has either given
or promised to give some performance fails without his fault to
receive in some material respect the agreed exchange for that
performance."

Id. (quoting 6 S. Williston, The Law of Contracts

§ 814, at 17-78 (3d ed. 1962) (emphasis added)).

Consideration

fails, not when the disparity in exchange is "unconscionable,"
but when, as in this case, the agreed performance fails in "some
material respect".

The correct standard is materiality.

There

can be no dispute that Outdoor Systems' performance was
materially deficient and that Bell failed to receive the agreed
exchange for its performance.

The trial court' s third conclusion

is erroneous as a matter of law.
B.

Second Conclusion--"Without Fault"

The trial court' s second conclusion of law states:
The defendant has defended against
Plaintiff s claim on the basis that there was
no [sic] failure of consideration. The Court
finds that there was no such failure of
consideration because such a finding requires
a finding that the party making the claim be
without fault. The court specifically finds
and concludes that the defendant was
negligent by not viewing the sign location
-11g:\wpl\198\00000qgn.W51

itself prior to the completion of the
contract.
(Conclusion No. 2. )

The court' s application of a strict

negligence standard to the failure of consideration analysis
constitutes reversible error.
The Utah Supreme Court has recently discussed failure
of consideration in Copper State Leasing Co. v. Blacker Appliance
& Furniture Co. , 770 P. 2d 88, 91 (Utah 1988):
Failure of consideration (as opposed to lack
of consideration) exists 'wherever one who
has either given or promised to give some
performance fails without his fault to
receive in some material respect the agreed
exchange for that performance. ' Bentlev v.
Potter. 694 P.2d 617, 619 (Utah 1984)
(quoting 6 S. Williston, The Law of Contracts
§ 814, at 17-78 (3d ed. 1962)). If there is
a lack of consideration, there is no
contract. When consideration fails, however,
promised performance cannot be compelled.
See also Polvalycoat Corp. v. Holcomb, 591 P. 2d 449, 451 (Utah
1979) ("a failure of performance which 'defeats the very object
of the contract' or '(is) of such prime importance that the
contract would not have been made if default in that particular
had been contemplated' is a material failure" warranting
rescission).
The trial court found only that Bruce Bell was
"negligent by not viewing the sign location itself prior to the
completion of the contract. "

(Conclusion No. 2. )

This legal

conclusion reflects a misperception of both the facts and the
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law.

Bell' s failure to view the sign before entering the

Advertising Agreement does not constitute "fault."
no contractual or common law standard of care.

Bell violated

Rather, Bell

proceeded reasonably in a manner consistent with the express and
implied representations of Outdoor Systems that the board could
effectively carry an advertising message.

Outdoor Systems was a

large, experienced outdoor advertising company with full
knowledge of the board' s limitations.

Further, Outdoor Systems

knew it was dealing with an out-of-state company that, by reason
of distance and economy, must rely on Outdoor Systems for
information and professional service.

Outdoor Systems had no

reason to believe that Bell or any agent with experience
sufficient to evaluate the suitability of the board would
actually see the board before entering into the Advertising
Agreement.

Bell did all that it could reasonably do to ascertain

the suitability of the board before entering into the Advertising
Agreement.

Conversely, before executing the Advertising

Agreement, Outdoor Systems did not advise Bell of any limitation
regarding the board.

Bell was "without fault" in entering into

this contract.
The trial court also erred in adopting an overly broad
legal construction of "without fault."

Whereas, the Utah Supreme

Court has held that a party claiming a failure of consideration
need not be completely without fault, the trial court rejected
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the failure of consideration of defense upon the slightest
showing of what it perceived to be "fault."

In Nielsen v. MFT

Leasing, 656 P. 2d 454 (Utah 1982), the plaintiff brought an
action on a computer lease agreement.

The defendant raised the

affirmative defense of failure of consideration alleging that the
computer delivered had a different serial number than the one
described in the lease.

Because the defendant had accepted

delivery of the computer, there was evidence that both parties
were "at fault" to some extent in allowing the misdelivery.
Nonetheless, the court held that failure of consideration
rendered the contract unenforceable.

££. at 456-57.

See also

Copper State Leasing Co, v. Blacker Appliance & Furniture Co. ,
770 P. 2d 88, 91-92 (Utah 1988) (construing Nielsen and pointing
out the evidence that "both parties were at fault to some
extent" ).
The application of the law in Nielsen and Copper State
finds support in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.

Section

157 states that fault will only bar a party' s relief when it
amounts to "a failure to act in good faith and in accordance with
reasonable standards of fair dealing. "
Contracts § 157 (1979).

Restatement (Second) of

Comment (a) to Section 157 points out

that during negotiations "each party is held to a degree of
responsibility appropriate to the justifiable expectations of the
other."

Id. at § 157 comment a (1979).
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Without question, Bell met this standard of good faith
and fair dealing.

It was perfectly justifiable for Bell to rely

on a company such as Outdoor Systems to provide advertising space
that could effectively carry a message.

There is no dispute that

the billboard was materially deficient and, thus, there was a
failure of consideration.
fault.

As a matter of law, Bell acted without

The trial court erroneously concluded that Bell could not

sustain its affirmative defense of failure of consideration and
for that reason the judgment should be reversed.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT BELL DID NOT
HAVE THE RIGHT TO REPUDIATE THE ADVERTISING AGREEMENT.
The trial court' s fourth conclusion of law states:
The defendant has claimed that it had a
right to reject the contract and that it
exercised that right. The defendant bases
its defense upon paragraph 10 of the second
page of the contract. The Court agrees that
defendant' s concern with regard to
readability and the effectiveness of the sign
was communicated to the plaintiff within a
reasonable time. The issue, therefore, is:
Can paragraph 10 of the contract be
reasonably interpreted to give the defendant
a right to total rejection upon
dissatisfaction with the final product? The
court finds that such a reading cannot be
given to the contract for the reason that
paragraph 10 of the contract does not go that
far and does not support Defendant7 s claim of
right to rejection of the entire contract.

(Conclusion, No. 4. )
The interpretation of a contract is a matter of law and
a trial court' s interpretation of a contract provision is
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accorded no particular deference.

Morris v. Mountain States

Telephone and Telegraph Co. , 658 P. 2d 1199, 1200 (Utah 1983).
Paragraph 10 of the Advertising Agreement stated:
(Advertiser) (Agency) shall inspect the
display within
days after
installation. Unless within such period,
(Advertiser) (Agency) gives written notice to
OUTDOOR specifying any defect, the display
shall be conclusively presumed to have been
inspected and approved for all purposes
whatsoever by (Advertiser) (Agency).
The trial court specifically found that Bell met any time
limitations imposed by this paragraph.

(Conclusion No. 4.

See

also Trial Transcript p. 58 [testimony of Bruce Brossart, sales
manager for Outdoor Systems that Bell gave timely notice]).

Thus

analysis of paragraph 10 raises two issues of contract
interpretation:

First, whether the inability of the board to

advertise was a "defect," and second, whether Bell could
repudiate the Advertising Agreement when Outdoor Systems failed
to cure the defect.
The trial court, consistent with its constricted view
of Outdoor Systems' contractual duties noted at pages 8 through
10 supra, confined its definition of "defect" to the reproduction
of the display.

(See Finding No. 34. )

However, such a

definition of the term "defect" in a commercial setting is far
too narrow.

The Texas Supreme Court recently held, in the

context of an implied warranty of merchantability, that "the word
' defect' means a condition of the goods that renders them unfit
-16g \wpl\198\00000qgn W51

for the ordinary purposes for which they are used because of a
lack of something necessary for adequacy. "
U.S.

Plas-Tex, Inc. v.

Steel Corp. . 772 S. W. 2d 442, 444 (Texas 1989) (emphasis

added).

Such a definition considers the entire purpose of the

contract and not just one aspect of the bargained for
performance.

In the present case, it is undisputed that the sign

provided by Outdoor Systems, because of its location, lacked a
trait necessary for adequacy—i. e. , visibility.

This was clearly

recognized by Outdoor Systems soon after the Advertising
Agreement was signed, but even the alteration of the graphics
urged by Outdoor Systems did not cure the defect.
Given that the billboard was defective, the sole
remaining issue is the nature of the remedy under the Advertising
Agreement.

The only reasonable interpretation of Paragraph 10 is

that, absent Outdoor System' s cure of a defect timely noted, Bell
could repudiate the contract and refuse to pay.

After it gave

timely notice to Outdoor Systems of the defect, Bell went so far
as to propose a solution to cure the defect--re-painting the
board to all graphics.

(Finding No. 26. )

However, Outdoor

Systems wrongfully insisted that Bell bear the cost of any
repainting thereby leaving Bell with only the option of rejecting
the contract.

Bell elected this option consistent with the terms

of the Advertising Agreement.

The trial court erred in
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concluding that Outdoor Systems was not in breach of paragraph
10.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT ASSUMPTION
QF fi?$K ^EQATgg A PEFENgE QF EPTgAj, MISTAKE
The trial court further erred in holding that "mutual

mistake may not be maintained if the mistake claimed was a risk
which was assumed by the parties"

and that "the risk of the

effectiveness of the sign was a risk assumed by the defendant
and, therefore, the contract is not voidable by reason of mutual
mistake. "

(Conclusion No. 9. )
The governing authorities make no mention of assumption

of risk in connection with the law of mutual mistake.

Rather,

this Court has held that "a mutual mistake occurs when both
parties, at the time of contracting, share a misconception about
a basic assumption or vital fact upon which they based their
bargain. "

Robert Langston, Ltd. v. McOuarrie, 741 P. 2d 554, 557

(Utah Ct. App. 1987) (citation omitted).

"Mutual mistake of fact

makes a contract voidable, and is a basis for equitable
recision."

£d. (citations omitted).

The key inquiry is whether

there was a misconception, not whether some risk was assumed.
The evidence in this case, giving all reasonable doubt
to Outdoor Systems, shows that both parties to the Advertising
Agreement proceeded initially under the assumption that the
Outdoor Systems board could effectively carry an adequate
advertising message, without material limitation on the form or
-18g \wpl\198\00000qgn W51

content of the ad.
agreement.

This assumption was at the heart of the

Bell needed effective advertisement and Outdoor

Systems could not stay in business long selling space that did
not advertise.

However, in the course of performance it became

apparent that there were significant limitations to the board' s
capabilities.

This was first recognized to some degree by

Outdoor Systems in January, 1989.

Later,

once the billboard was

in place, both parties fully recognized the board' s deficiencies.
A mutual mistake of fact occurred.
The trial court erred in concluding that assumption

of

the risk negates defense of mutual mistake and that Bell assumed
the risk of the effectiveness of the sign.

The facts as found by

the trial court do not support this conclusion.

Bell did assume

the risk that the design of the advertisement might not be
effective in drawing travelers to Kino Springs.

However, that

risk was founded on the reasonable assumption that the design on
the billboard would at least be visible to travelers.

It was

not.
Once again, the trial court apportioned fault to Bell
for failing to discover the great distance of the sign from the
road.

However, as already noted, "a mistaken party's fault in

failing to know or discover the facts before making the contract
does not bar him from avoidance or reformation . . . unless his
fault amounts to a failure to act in good faith and in accordance
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with reasonable standards of fair dealing. »' Restatement (Second)
of Contracts § 157 (1979).

Bell's conduct met this standard.

No

claim can be made that Bell did not act with the utmost good
faith and within reasonable standards of fair dealing.
The mutual mistake of the parties was the assumption
that the finished billboard would be visible from Interstate 19.
Absent actual knowledge or reasonable notice, Bell could not have
assumed the risk that, as Outdoor Systems knew, the sign would be
200 yards from the point of optimal visibility.

This was not

within the reasonable range of possibilities that Bell could have
contemplated.

The trial court erred in concluding that an

advertiser assumes the risk that the advertising space offered
for lease without limitation would not physically be visible by
the very people to whom it is directed.

Such a conclusion is

erroneous as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
The trial court in this matter entered conclusions of
law based on erroneous legal standards and at variance with its
own Findings of Facts and other undisputed facts.

Effective

advertising was the essence of the agreement of the parties.
Outdoor Systems instead provided a sign with no advertising value
to Bell.

The trial court erred in concluding that (a) this was

not a failure of consideration, (b) Bell did not have the
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contractual right to reject the contract when it learned of the
material defects in the sign provided, and (c) that a mistake of
fact did not occur.
The appellant Bruce Bell and Associates, Inc.
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the judgment of the
trial court and remand the case with directions that judgment be
entered for the appellant, awarding costs on appeal and
attorneys' fees pursuant to the Advertising Agreement and Utah
Code Ann. § 78-27-56. 5.
DATED this J_

day of February, 1991.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

By /M(A <C - ^/^y
/
yJE±irt C.

Olson /
/
Douglas C. Tingey
Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellant Bruce Bell &
Associates, Inc.
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
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annENDUM

-22g \wpl\198\00000qgn W51

VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
E r i c C. O l s o n ( 4 1 0 8 )

Attorneys for Defendant
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
OUTDOOR SYSTEMS, INC.,

)
)
)
)

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCISIONS OF LAW

)

Ctfvil No. 893C06965CV

BRUCE BELL & ASSOCIATES,
INC. , a Utah Corporation,

)
)

Honorable Judge Watson

Defendant.

)

Plaintiff,
vs.

_)

Trial of the above-referenced matter was heard before
the bench on August 7, 1990, before the Honorable Edward A.
Watson.

Paul H. Van Dyke of Elggren & Van Dyke appeared on

behalf of the Plaintiff.

Eric C. Olson of Van Cott, Bagley,

Cornwall & McCarthy appeared on behalf of the defendant.
Witnesses were sworn and evidence was taken on behalf of both
Plaintiff and Defendant.

The Court, having now considered all

the evidence and the arguments of the counsel and for good cause
therefore appearing, hereby enters it:

FINDINGS OF ThQl
1.

The plaintiff is an outdoor advertising company,

in the business of providing outdoor advertising space and
preparing signs for its various clients.
2.

The defendant is an advertising firm based in

Salt Lake City.
3.

At all times relevant, both Plaintiff and

Defendant were represented in all matters relevant to this case
by individuals having substantial experience in outdoor
advertising.
4.

The defendant Bruce Bell & Associates had, prior

to the contract at issue with the Plaintiff, previously rendered
services for its client, Kino Springs.
5.

The defendant had earlier prepared a magazine

advertisement for Kino Springs and decided that a follow-up
billboard advertisement should be put in place.

The billboard

was to follow the concept of the magazine advertisement in that
is (sic) should be a pictorial and should be dignified.
6.

In late October, 1988, Kino Springs directed the

defendant to prepare a design for and obtain a space for
displaying an outdoor sign in Arizona located on 1-19 south of
Amado.
7.

In connection with the directions from Kino

Springs, the defendant, by and through Bruce Bell, called
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Plaintiff's representative, Steve Brossart, and enquired of th
availability of advertising space.
8.

At the time of the call, the plaintiff was

completing a new sign in the are of interest to Kino Springs.
It was the only sign available in the area.
9.

Steve Brossart sent a packet of information to

the defendant as a follow-up to the conversation which packet
was entered into evidence as Exhibits

M

D-3", "0-33", "D-3b'f an

"D-3c" consisting, among other things, of photographs of the
sign taken by Steve Brossart.
10.

The defendant contacted Kino Springs and

requested that it send a representative to drive by the sign
location and approve it.
11.

This was accomplished.

The defendant ordinarily would have had one of

its own employees drive-by and approve the sign location but d
not do so in this instance because the location was out-ofstate.

The sign was located eight miles south of Green Valley

Arizona.

According, it made an economic decision to have its

client do the drive-by.
12.

An employee of Kino Springs approved the sign

13.

Steve Brossart called Bruce Bell shortly

location.

thereafter.

Mr. Bell indicated that the location was approved
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and said that he would sign the contract earlier submitted for a
one year term,
14.
plaintiff.

The signed contract was faxed back to the

Art work for the design of the sign was to follow.
15.

Bruce Bell and the defendant created a concept

for the outdoor advertising following the concept used earlier
in a magazine advertisement, which included
a.

A picture which was to realistically depict

b.

Copy work necessary for the sign;

c.

Art work prepared by an outside contractor;

d.

Directional language for the sign.

Kino Springs;

and,

16.

The above decisions made by Mr. Bell with respect

to the sign design were consciously made knowing that the sign
was to be cross-reader.
17

The outside artist prepared a mock-up of the sign

which was intended to be proportionate to the finished sign.
18.

A copy of the artwork and mock-up for the

billboard were sent to Kino Springs by the defendant for
approval

They v.ere approved and later sent by the defendant to

the plaintiff for reproduction in the creation of the billboard.
19.

The artwork which was submitted by the defendant

to Plaintiff had various overlays to show color, graphics,
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proportion and, in general, all detail to be included in the
sign.
20.

Upon receiving the artwork, Steve Brossart,

representing the plaintiff, expressed concerns to Mr. Bell
concerning the readability of the graphics.

In particular, Mr.

Brossart was concerned that the graphics were too small to be
read from the ughvay and recommended to Mr. Bell tr.at the size
of the graphics be increased or that, to improve readability,
the sign be all graphic and the pictorial be eliminated.
21.

Mr. Bell decided to keep the pictorial but agreed

with Mr. Brossart's recomrendation to increase the size of the
graphic be extending the width of the sign and, thereby,
increase the size of the letters and, at the same time, keep the
letters proportional to the pictorial.

Mr. Bell specifically

requested that the graphics and pictorial be proportionate.
22.

The sign was thereafter constructed and a

completion package was sent by Plaintiff to the defendant.

The

advertisement was hung on the billboard on February 15, 1989.
23.

The completion package did not indicate how far

the sign was from the various lanes of highway.

That

information was not specifically requested by Defendant of (sic)
Plaintiff and the information, though in the files of Plaintiff,
was not readily available to Mr. Brossart.
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24.

The defendant, thereafter, asked as

representative of Kino Springs to drive by the sign for its
approval.
25.

The defendant was advised by Kino Springs that

the sign was not visible from the highway and that it did not
approve of the sign.
26.

On or about March 1, 1989, the defendant advised

Steve Brossart of Plaintiff that the client, Kino Springs, was
not happy with the sign and asked for the possibility of having
the sign re-painted to show all graphics.

Mr. Brossart advised

that it would be acceptable if the client would bear the cost of
re-painting.
27.

The contract entered into between Plaintiff and

Defendant specifically indicated that in the event re-painting
was necessary, that the defendant and not the plaintiff would be
responsible for the expense of the re-painting.
28.

The defendant later contacted the plaintiff and

indicated that the defendant felt that the plaintiff should bear
the cost of re-painting.

The plaintiff declined to re-paint the

sign at its own expense.
29.

Cancellation of the sign was later discussed.

Plaintiff agreed to attempt to obtain new advertising for the
space but indicated that the defendant must pay for the space
until it was resold.
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30.

The parties also had a discussion with respect to

relocating the sign to Kino Springs as a form of settlement.
31.

None of the settlement negotiations resulted in a

resolution of the matter and no settlement agreement was
obtained.
32.

After the sign was in place, Steve Brossart, of

Plaintiff, drove by the sign and, in his opinion, the graphics
were not readily seen but the pictorial could be seen.
33.

After the sign was in place, Larry Pinnock, a

representative of Defendant, drove by the sign three times and
could not see the sign on his dnve-bys.

On his last drive-by,

he took a number of measurements with respect to the distance of
the sign from the highway.

Those measurements, which are

undisputed, show that the sign was approximately 200 yards from
the point of optimal visibility in the oncoming lane of traffic
on 1-19.
34.

The defendant admits that there were no defects

in the reproduction of the display, that it was prepared
pursuant to the instructions of the defendant and that the sign
was maintained for the full twelve month contract.
Additionally, the defendant was regularly invoiced for each
month of the contract.

The defendant failed and refused to make

any payment therefore.
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35.

The p a r t i e s s t i p u l a t e d t h a t t h e p r i n c i p a l amount

unpaid under the terms of the contract i s the sum of $8,323. 20,
p l u s i n t e r e s t a t 1 1/2% per month on a l l unpaid balances.
36.

The p a r t i e s reserved, pending the final

of t h i s m a t t e r , the issue of a t t o r n e y ' s fees.

decision

The c o n t r a c t does

p r o v i d e for an award of a t t o r n e y ' s fees to the p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y .
37.

The p a r t i e s

s t i p u l a t e d t h a t t h e damages

would n o t e x c e e d t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n a l

limits

of t h i s

From t h e f o r e g o i n g F i n d i n g s of F a c t ,

claimed

Court.

t h e Court now

makes and e n t e r s i t s :
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

The Court finds t h a t t h e defendant f a i l e d t o pay

t h e c o n t r a c t amount based upon i t s e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t t h e
plaintiff

would provide a s i g n l o c a t i o n which would be

effective.

The Court finds t h a t t h e r e i s nothing in the

c o n t r a c t which requires t h e p l a i n t i f f
of Defendant.
faithfully

to meet t h i s

expectation

Rather, the p l a i n t i f f s c o n t r a c t u a l duty was t o

reproduce the s i g n from t h e artwork provided t o i t by

defendant.
2.

The defendant has defended a g a i n s t

Plaintiff's

claim on t h e h a s i s that t h e r e was no f a i l u r e of c o n s i d e r a t i o n .
The Court finds that t h e r e was no such f a i l u r e of c o n s i d e r a t i o n
because such a finding r e q u i r e s a f i n d i n g t h a t the p a r t y making
t h e claim be without f a u l t .

The Court s p e c i f i c a l l y finds and
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concludes that the defendant was negligent by not viewing tr.e
sign location itself prior to the completion of the contract.
3.

The Court finds that although there may have been

unequal consideration in this contract that the disparity in
consideration was not unconscionable and, therefore, does not
find a failure of consideration by reason of unconscionability
in the disparity of consideration.
4.

The defendant has claimed that it had a right to

re]ect the contract and that it exercised that right.

The

defendant bases its defense upon paragraph 10 of the second page
of the contract.

The Court agrees that defendant's concern with

regard to readability and the effectiveness of the sign was
communicated to the plaintiff within a reasonable time.
issue, therefore, is:

The

Can paragraph 10 of the contract be

reasonably interpreted to give the defendant a right to total
rejection upon dissatisfaction with the final product?

The

Court finds that such a reading cannot be given to the contract
for the reason that paragraph 10 of the contract does not go
that far and dees not support Defendant' s claim of right to
rejection of the entire contract.
5.

The defendant has defended against Plaintiff's

claim on the basis of mutual mistake.

The Court finds that

mutual mistake may not be maintained if the mistake claimed was
a risk which was assumed by the parties.
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The Court finds that

the risk of the effectiveness of the sign was a risk assumed by
the defendant and, therefore, the contract is not voidable by
reason of mutual mistake.
6.

Additionally, the Court finds that mutual mistake

is not a viable defense if the mistake concerns a prediction or
judgment.

The Court finds that the effectiveness of the sign

was a prediction or judgment made by the defendant despite the
advise by Steve Brossart that the sign should be changed to all
graphic to be readable.
7.

The Court concludes that Plaintiff is entitled to

judgment in the sum of $8,323.20 principal amounts, together
with interest on the unpaid balances at 1 1/2% per month, plus
Plaintiff's reasonable attorney's fees and costs.

The judgment

shall not, by stipulation of the parties, exceed the
jurisdictional limit of the Court.
8.

Judgment should be rendered accordingly.

DATED this

3

(rbJlCv

day of
BY

STODGE
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OURT

, 1990.

CEfiTJFXCATg QF gSfiVICE
I hereby certify that I caused ^r true and correct copy
of the within and foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to be mailed,
postage prepaid, this

f

day of February, 1991, to the

following:
Paul H. Van Dyke
ELGGREN & VAN DYKE
261 East 300 South, #175
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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